May 18, 2016

Long Awaited New Overtime Rules Issued

Posted in Administrative Exemption, Computer-related Occupations Exemption, Executive Exemption, Exempt/Non-Exempt Employees, Fair Labor Standards Act, Outside Sales Exemption, Overtime, Professional Exemption, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , at 1:15 pm by Tom Jacobson

time clockThe much-anticipated new overtime rules have been issued by the United States Department of Labor. The new rules will go into effect December 1, 2016 so employers will have until then to prepare.

The Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) has published an excellent summary of the new rules, and I encourage you to review that. Then, contact me to discuss how to implement the new rules in your workplace.

Also, the new rules will be discussed at the 13th Annual West Central Minnesota Employment Law Update. There are still a few seats available at the seminar — click here for registration information.

For more information about these or other employment law issues, please contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this article are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2016 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA.

May 5, 2016

Tick Tock: Appeals Court Opens Door to Stale Discrimination Claims by Broadly Interpreting Statute of Limitations Tolling Clause

Posted in Age, Discrimination, Employee Handbooks, Harassment, Limitation of Actions, MDHR Mediation, Sexual Harassment, Statutes of Limitation tagged , , , , , , , at 11:42 am by Tom Jacobson

Tom Jacobson retake - Copy - Cropped

“In light of the Peterson decision, employers should review their HR complaint policies to minimize the chance of inadvertent extensions of the Minnesota Human Rights Act statute of limitations,” says employment law attorney Tom Jacobson.

Employers may need to update their HR complaint policies and procedures in light of a May 2, 2016 decision by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in the case of Peterson v. City of Minneapolis. The decision has the impact of potentially extending the time limit employees have for pursuing claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and policy updates may minimize the impact of this decision.

The Peterson case started when two Minneapolis police officers claimed their October, 2011 transfers were the result of age discrimination. The officers filed complaints with the city’s human resources department a month later. The HR department investigated the complaints, and in January, 2013 the department concluded that the transfers were not based on age.

The officers then filed age discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. They later withdrew those charges, but in March, 2014 they filed a lawsuit against the city of Minneapolis. The trial court dismissed the officers’ case on the basis that it was started after the one year statute of limitations in the Minnesota Human Rights Act had expired. One of the officers appealed.

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the appellate court noted that under the MHRA:

The running of the one-year limitation period is suspended during the time a potential charging party and respondent are voluntarily engaged in a dispute resolution process involving a claim of unlawful discrimination under this chapter, including arbitration, conciliation, mediation or grievance procedures pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or statutory, charter, ordinance provisions for a civil service or other employment system or a school board sexual harassment or sexual violence policy.

Thus, the issue before the Court of Appeals was whether filing an internal complaint with the city’s HR department meant the parties were “voluntarily engaged in a dispute resolution process involving a claim of unlawful discrimination,” so as to suspend (or “toll”) the running of the MHRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The court ruled that they were.

Specifically, the court held that the city’s HR complaint process was a “dispute resolution process” under the MHRA, so by engaging in that process, the statute of limitations did not run while that process was ongoing. Consequently, the officers’ MDHR charge, which was filed more than a year after the alleged discrimination, was ruled to be timely despite the MHRA’s one-year statute of limitations.

With this ruling, the Court of Appeals has essentially given employees a tool for dragging out their deadline for filing MHRA charges or lawsuits well beyond the one-year time limit they would otherwise have. This is because for as long as they and the employer are engaged in an internal HR complaint process, the statute of limitations clock will likely not be ticking.

Taken to extremes, this means an employee could file an internal complaint 364 days after an alleged discriminatory act, thereby likely suspending the statute of limitations that would otherwise have expired the next day. And, because the Court of Appeals did not clarify the limits of what it means to “voluntarily engage in” such internal complaint processes, it appears an employee could extend the time limit almost indefinitely by repeatedly engaging the employer in ongoing discussions about the same problem or the process itself.

It is difficult to predict how this case will play out in practice. However, to minimize its impact, employers should consider: revising HR complaint policies to address how such complaints impact the MHRA’s statute of limitations; promptly investigating and resolving discrimination and harassment complaints so as to quickly end what could be perceived as “voluntary engagement” in a “dispute resolution process.”

For more information about these or other employment law issues, please contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this article are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2016 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA.

April 22, 2016

Registration Open for 13th Annual Employment Law Update

Posted in Discrimination, Fair Labor Standards Act, Reasonable Accommodation tagged , , , , at 11:13 am by Tom Jacobson

Swenson Lervick Law FirmPlease join us for the 13th Annual West Central Minnesota Employment Law Update at the Alexandria Technical and Community College on Thursday, June 2, 2016!

This year’s topics include:

  • Hot off the Press — Employment Law News You Can Use
  • The Changing Nature of Accommodation
  • New FLSA Developments and Salary Rules
  • Legal Considerations for Transgender Employees

This annual Employment Law Update will again focus on the significant changes and updates to employment law issues and provide current information and resources in a variety of important areas. In addition, the event will include an informative panel discussion with employement law attorneys who will answer your questions about the featured sessions and other timely topics on employment law. SHRM CP, SCP, and HRCI credits are approved for the sessions, with certificate information available for attendees.

Presenting attorneys will be Tom Jacobson, Mike Moberg, Sara McGrane and Penelope Phillips.

PLUS…this year’s attendees will also enjoy this Bonus HR Session:

Cultivate Courage” presented by Dave Cornell. Dave is a keynote speaker, trainer, and personal development and leadership coach, provides a variety of services to individuals and organizations, all designed to help people be better than they think they can be and do things they think might not be possible: see opportunities instead of roadblocks, embrace change and create a vision for new possibilities, and transform and energize from the inside out.

Please see the full seminar Agenda and Registration information on the attached flyers.

Seating is limited. Registrations are due by May 23, 2016.

We hope to see you there!

February 18, 2016

New Overtime Rules Could Result in Loss of Exempt Status for Salaried Employees

Posted in Administrative Exemption, Executive Exemption, Exempt/Non-Exempt Employees, Fair Labor Standards Act, Hours Worked, Professional Exemption tagged , , , , , , , , , at 4:58 pm by Tom Jacobson

new flsa overtime rules

Many salaried employees would lose their exempt status under the DOL’s new overtime rules.

The U.S. Department of Labor’s proposed changes to the nation’s overtime pay rules would have a profound impact on workplaces throughout the country. The impact would be the potential loss of exempt status for many salaried employees. To prepare, employers should familiarize themselves with the proposed new rule and review their pay practices to ensure compliance in case the new overtime rules take effect.

The new rules would increase the minimum salary an employee must be paid before s/he may be classified as exempt from overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. This means many employees who are now properly classified as exempt will no longer be exempt. Consequently, they would then be eligible for overtime pay if they work more than forty hours in a workweek.

The change would come about because the FLSA generally requires most U.S. employers to pay overtime (that is, one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay) when employees work more than forty hours in a work week. However, certain categories of employees are exempt from that requirement. To qualify for some exemptions, those employees must not only perform certain duties as specified in the FLSA, but they must also be paid a minimum salary.

Currently, that minimum salary is $455 per week ($23,660 per year). Under the new rule, that threshold would more than double to $970 per week ($50,440 per year).

The impact can be illustrated with a hypothetical workplace where an employee is currently paid a salary somewhere between $24,000 and $50,000 per year and works an average of 45 to 50 hours per week. Assuming that employee meets one of the FLSA’s “duties” tests, the employee would likely be considered exempt and not entitled to overtime pay. Therefore, the employee would be paid the same regardless of how many hours s/he works in a week.

If the new rules take effect, the same employee would no longer be exempt, and s/he would be entitled to overtime pay for the extra five to ten hours of work each week. Therefore, the employer would need to increase the employee’s salary to meet the new threshold and maintain the exemption, or the employer would need to convert the employee to an hourly-rate employee and pay time and a half for any overtime.

The new rules have not yet gone into effect, and it is not entirely clear if and when they will. They were initially slated to take effect this spring. However, the Society for Human Resource Management reports that this may not happen until later this year. SHRM also reports there is a remote chance that Congress could overturn the rules using the Congressional Review Act and/or that the rules will be challenged in court.

In the meantime, employers should pay attention to the potential rule change and be prepared to change their pay practices to remain in compliance. Suggestions include:

  • Determine which currently exempt employees would no longer be exempt if the salary threshold increases;
  • Assuming an employee’s exemption would be lost under the new rules, decide whether to increase the employee’s salary to meet the new threshold or convert the employee’s salary to an hourly rate basis;
  • Budget for any increased overtime costs resulting from employees who would become eligible for it under the new rules;
  • Review scheduling issues to determine whether hours can be reduced to limit the overtime liability for an employee who must be treated as non-exempt;
  • Address morale issues that could result from any perceived “demotion” of employees from exempt/salaried to non-exempt/hourly status.

In addition, although the proposed new rules do not alter the “duties” test for FLSA exemptions, employers would be wise to take this opportunity to review their exempt employees’ duties to determine whether they actually meet those duties tests. This is because even if an employee meets the salary test (whether under the current or proposed new standards), that does not automatically mean the employee is exempt from the law’s overtime pay requirements.

For more information about FLSA exemption issues, please contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2016 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

October 6, 2015

Jack Link’s Missing Link: Company Pays $50K to Settle Claim of Ongoing Sexual Harassment

Posted in Discrimination, Employee Handbooks, Gender / Sex, Harassment, Harassment, Hostile Work Environment, Minnesota Human Rights Act, Sexual Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , at 10:28 am by Tom Jacobson

A recently settled Minnesota Department of Human Rights charge against Jack Link’s Beef Jerky emphasizes the importance of follow-through when responding to sexual harassment allegations. According to the Department, Jack Link’s initially took the “right step” in disciplining the alleged harasser but then failed to monitor the situation, which included ongoing harassment.

Specifically, MDHR reports that shortly after being hired by Jack Link’s, a female employee’s supervisor made sexual advances toward her, called her “baby,” said she was beautiful, asked if she was single, chanted “pack baby pack,” and asked if he was too old for her. The Department also reports that although Jack Link’s initially disciplined the supervisor, the company then promoted him to be woman’s direct supervisor, after which he continued to harass the employee. Claiming she could no longer tolerate the work environment, the woman quit.

Thus, based on the MDHR’s findings, the missing link in Jack Link’s response was the lack of follow-through and monitoring. As noted by MDHR Commissioner Kevin Lindsey:

This is an unusual case in that the employer took the right step in originally disciplining the supervisor. The employer however undermined its efforts by not subsequently monitoring the actions of the alleged harasser. Employers need to maintain contact with the employee who has complained of sexual harassment to make sure that the measures that they have undertaken are actually working.

To settle the charge, Jack Link’s agreed to pay the victim $50,000.00 and to provide training on the Minnesota Human Rights Act and how to properly respond to sexual harassment allegations.

Generally speaking, employers must first take steps to prevent unlawful workplace harassment. But if, despite those efforts, an employee claims that harassment has occurred, employers must take prompt action to correct and stop that behavior. As the Jack Link’s case points out, this includes careful monitoring and follow-through to make sure the harassment does not continue or recur.

For more information about this article or about the harassment training, policy development, and related services I can provide, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

August 26, 2015

Target Settlement Sheds Light on Disparate Impact Discrimination

Posted in Application Process, Background Checking, Disability, Discrimination, Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment, Gender / Sex, Race, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , at 9:15 am by Tom Jacobson

By now, you’ve probably read or heard about Target Corporation’s agreement to pay $2.8 million to settle an EEOC discrimination charge. Unlike a “disparate treatment” case where the plaintiffs claim that an employer’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent, this was a “disparate impact” case where the EEOC alleged that screening tests used by Target disproportionately excluded applicants on the basis of race and gender and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. So, what’s the difference between “disparate impact” and “disparate treatment” discrimination?

Disparate impact discrimination cases typically arise out of pre-employment tests, medical exams, background check policies and similar assessments that are used to screen candidates for a job or advancement within a company. The theory was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1971 in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. In that case, the Court noted that:

[Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.

The Griggs Court also stressed that good intentions do not matter, for “[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”

Thus, in a disparate impact case, the focus is not on evidence that the employer intended to discriminate.  Rather, the focus is on statistics. If the statistics show that the employer’s screening practice — no matter how innocuous on its face — has a substantial adverse impact on a protected group, the employer must show that the practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. The employer might still lose the case if there is evidence that the company refused to adopt an alternative employment practice that would have served the employer’s legitimate interests without creating a disparate impact on a protected class.

In contrast, in a disparate treatment case, the focus is on evidence of the employer’s intent. If the evidence shows that the employer intentionally discriminated against an employee or applicant on the basis of a protected classification, the employer will be held liable for unlawful employment discrimination based on the disparate treatment theory.

In addition to paying nearly $3 million to settle the EEOC case, Target also agreed to several non-monetary terms, such as:

  • Not using the assessments again as part of its exempt-level employment selection procedures;
  • Changing its applicant tracking systems to ensure that the collection of data is sufficient to assess adverse impact;
  • Performing a predictive validity study for all exempt assessments currently in use and any new assessments the company expects to use;
  • Monitoring its assessments for exempt-level professional positions for adverse impact based on race, ethnicity and gender; and
  • Annually providing the EEOC with a detailed summary of the studies and the adverse impact analysis conducted.

As the Target case shows, even seemingly innocent employment screening practices can violate Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, employers who use such devices should carefully evaluate their potential adverse impacts before using or continuing them.

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

June 15, 2015

Supreme Court Rules for EEOC in Abercrombie & Fitch Dress Code Case

Posted in Application Process, Discrimination, Dress Code, Grooming, Reasonable Accommodation, Relgious Discrimination, Religion, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 tagged , , , , , , , , at 10:36 am by Tom Jacobson

Employers must now use more caution when their dress codes clash with their employees’ religious beliefs. That is the result of the United States Supreme Court’s June 1, 2015 ruling in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

The case arose after Samantha Elauf applied for a job with Abercrombie. Elauf is a practicing Muslim who, consistent with her understanding of her religion’s requirements, wears a headscarf known as a hijab. Abercrombie had a “look policy” that prohibited employees from wearing “caps” as being too informal for work attire. The policy did not define “caps.”

After an interview, the assistant store manager rated Elauf as qualified to be hired, but she was concerned that the headscarf would violate the company’s “look” policy. Elauf, however, never requested an exception to that policy so that she could wear the hijab. The assistant manager asked her district manager for guidance, and she told the district manager that she believed Elauf wore the headscarf because or her faith. The district manager said the headscarf would violate the look policy, and he directed the assistant store manager to not hire Elauf.

The EEOC then sued Abercrombie on behalf of Elauf on the basis that the company’s refusal to hire Elauf violated the religious discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. The trial court ruled in favor of the EEOC (See Abercrombie & Fitch Dressed Down over Hijab in Religious Discrimination Case). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that because Elauf never provided Abercrombie with actual notice of her need for accommodation of her religious belief, Abercrombie could not be liable under Title VII.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the EEOC and trial court. Specifically, the high court ruled that to prove a claim of religious discrimination in the workplace, an applicant need only show only that his/her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer knew of the need. An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.

Thus, even if an employee or applicant has not requested a religious accommodation (for example, a dress code or grooming policy exception, schedule modification, etc.), an employer must not use that person’s religious faith as a factor in making decisions about the employee or applicant. In addition, employers should keep their dress and grooming codes somewhat flexible to allow for the accommodation of affected religious beliefs.

For more information, see the EEOC’s publications, Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace and Fact Sheet on Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, or contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

April 29, 2015

Supreme Court Slams Brakes on EEOC Lawsuits

Posted in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Conciliation, Discrimination, EEOC Conciliation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 tagged , , , , at 3:57 pm by Tom Jacobson

IMG_5578The United States Supreme Court today slammed the brakes on lawsuits started by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Specifically, the Court ruled that because the EEOC has a statutory duty to attempt conciliation before suing, the courts have authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled that duty. Giving courts the authority to review EEOC conciliation should stifle what some believed was the EEOC’s overly zealous litigation strategy.

The case is Mach Mining, LLC v EEOC, which started as a Title VII sex discrimination charge against the company. During its investigation, the EEOC found probable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred. The agency then invited the company to participate in conciliation to resolve the dispute. The agency also said that a representative would contact them to start the process. A year later the EEOC sent another letter saying that conciliation had been unsuccessful. The EEOC then sued the company.

In response to the lawsuit, Mach Mining argued that the EEOC had not attempted to conciliate in good faith before suing them. This argument was based on Title VII’s requirement that before suing, the EEOC must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”

The EEOC countered by arguing that the courts do not have the power to decide whether or not the agency makes such an effort. The agency also argued that even if the courts have that power, its two letters to Mach Mining met that standard.

The Court agreed with Mach Mining and held that the courts have the authority to review whether or not pre-suit conciliation was adequate. Specifically, the Court noted that:

Judicial review of administrative action is the norm in our legal system, and nothing in Title VII withdraws the courts’ authority to determine whether the EEOC has fulfilled its duty to attempt conciliation of claims.

The Court then went on to establish a judicial process for making this determination:

  • A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has performed its conciliation obligations but that its efforts have failed will usually suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement.
  • If the employer then provides credible evidence of its own, in the form of an affidavit or otherwise, indicating that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim, a court must conduct the fact-finding necessary to decide that limited dispute.
  • Should the court find in favor of the employer, the appropriate remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary compliance.

By adding this level of judicial oversight to the EEOC charge process, those faced with Title VII discrimination charges should now have greater assurance that the EEOC will work harder to resolve those charges informally before rushing to the courthouse.

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

March 26, 2015

Pregnancy Accommodation Claims Revived by US Supreme Court in Young v. UPS

Posted in Discrimination, Gender / Sex, Pregnancy, Pregnancy, Pregnancy Leave, Reasonable Accommodation, Women's Economic Security Act tagged , , , , , at 11:56 pm by Tom Jacobson

pregnancy accommodation

Me, in 1991, wearing the “empathy belly” in Lamaze class the day before our first son was born.

In a 6-3 decision the U.S. Supreme Court this week revived Peggy Young’s pregnancy accommodation claims against UPS. The high court’s decision clarifies how the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) is to be applied to pregnant employees who work for employers that accommodate employees with nonpregnancy-related disabilities.

The PDA is a 1978 addition to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The law has two main parts. First, it says that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Second, it says that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”

At issue in Young’s case was the fact that after she became pregnant, her doctor imposed a 20 pound lifting restriction. UPS had a 70 pound lifting requirement for drivers like Young, so they told her she could not work while under that restriction. Young, however, presented evidence that UPS accommodated other workers who suffered on-the-job injuries, had ADA-qualifying disabilities, or had lost their Department of Transportation certifications. Thus, Young claimed that UPS violated the PDA by accommodating the other workers but not those who were pregnant.

The District Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals both rejected Young’s claims, but the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and revived her case. In so doing, the court established the following framework for proving that a woman was subjected to disparate treatment under the pregnancy accommodation requirements of the PDA.

First, the woman must present evidence that: (a) she belongs to the protected class; (b) she sought accommodation; (c) the employer did not accommodate her; and (d) the employer accommodated others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” If the employee proves that much, the employer may then try to justify its failure to accommodate by presenting evidence of “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation. If the employer does so, the employee may then try to rebut that evidence with evidence that the employer’s reason was a pretext (that is, a facade or cover-up of the real discriminatory reason).

The case clarifies that pregnancy accommodation claims can be brought under the PDA, and it establishes what must be proved in order to win such cases. Therefore, it is important for employers and employees to understand their respective rights and obligations under this law. In particular they need to recognize that employers must accommodate pregnant employees if they accommodate nonpregnant employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work.”

Finally, here’s a reminder for Minnesota employers and employees. The state’s Women’s Economic Security Act (WESA), which was passed in 2014, includes its own pregnancy accommodation requirements. This law only applies to Minnesota employers with 21 or more employees. The PDA, however, applies to employers with 15 or more employees. Consequently, smaller employers (15-20 employees) will only have to comply with the PDA, but larger ones will need to comply with both laws.

My wife and I with said first-born in 2014 at his graduation from the US Air Force Academy (not likely due to the empathy belly).

My wife and I in 2014 with said first-born at his graduation from the US Air Force Academy (not likely due to the empathy belly).

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

January 29, 2015

Hit-men, harassment & the perils of office romance

Posted in Discrimination, Employee Handbooks, Gender / Sex, Harassment, Harassment, Hostile Work Environment, Minnesota Human Rights Act, Office Dating, Office Romance - Dating, Sexual Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Workplace Romance tagged , , , , , , , at 11:09 am by Tom Jacobson

office romanceWith Valentine’s Day just around the corner, it seems like a good time to remind everyone that office romance is generally a very bad idea. After all, it might lead to murder-for-hire plots, ugly custody fights, and the occasional sexual harassment suit.

Take the recent Stearns County, Minnesota case involving Nomad Pipeline Services CEO Robert Schueller. He was charged with orchestrating a murder-for-hire plot where it’s alleged that he tried to hire a hit man to kill the fiance’ of an employee with whom he had an affair (see MyFox9, Charges: Office affair break-up, murder-for-hire plot). Mr. Schueller ultimately pled guilty to one count of sending threatening communication (See WCCO TV, Company President Pleads Guilty in Plot Involving Employees).

Or, there’s the case that fellow blawger Eric Meyer recently noted where an office affair apparently resulted in pregnancy, a custody battle, and a sexual harassment claim.

Those are extreme examples of love gone bad, but I’ve seen office romance cases that have taken a big toll, albeit without the intrigue. Co-workers perceive favoritism toward the boss’s paramour. Jilted lovers persist in their advances, which are then perceived as hostile. Encounters that were once consensual are suddenly claimed to be unwelcome. Employees struggle to know how to end a personal relationship when they have to continue working with their former significant other. What was once romance becomes harassment that ends up in court.

Of course, there are examples where office dating blossoms into healthy relationships. However, no one can predict where a new romance will lead. To mimimize the risk that it will lead to the courthouse, see my prior article, Big Bang and the Office Dating Game.

Have you taken my poll on President Obama’s mandatory paid sick leave proposal? If not, click here. Poll closes January 30.

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

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