August 26, 2015

Target Settlement Sheds Light on Disparate Impact Discrimination

Posted in Application Process, Background Checking, Disability, Discrimination, Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment, Gender / Sex, Race, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , at 9:15 am by Tom Jacobson

By now, you’ve probably read or heard about Target Corporation’s agreement to pay $2.8 million to settle an EEOC discrimination charge. Unlike a “disparate treatment” case where the plaintiffs claim that an employer’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent, this was a “disparate impact” case where the EEOC alleged that screening tests used by Target disproportionately excluded applicants on the basis of race and gender and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. So, what’s the difference between “disparate impact” and “disparate treatment” discrimination?

Disparate impact discrimination cases typically arise out of pre-employment tests, medical exams, background check policies and similar assessments that are used to screen candidates for a job or advancement within a company. The theory was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1971 in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. In that case, the Court noted that:

[Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.

The Griggs Court also stressed that good intentions do not matter, for “[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”

Thus, in a disparate impact case, the focus is not on evidence that the employer intended to discriminate.  Rather, the focus is on statistics. If the statistics show that the employer’s screening practice — no matter how innocuous on its face — has a substantial adverse impact on a protected group, the employer must show that the practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. The employer might still lose the case if there is evidence that the company refused to adopt an alternative employment practice that would have served the employer’s legitimate interests without creating a disparate impact on a protected class.

In contrast, in a disparate treatment case, the focus is on evidence of the employer’s intent. If the evidence shows that the employer intentionally discriminated against an employee or applicant on the basis of a protected classification, the employer will be held liable for unlawful employment discrimination based on the disparate treatment theory.

In addition to paying nearly $3 million to settle the EEOC case, Target also agreed to several non-monetary terms, such as:

  • Not using the assessments again as part of its exempt-level employment selection procedures;
  • Changing its applicant tracking systems to ensure that the collection of data is sufficient to assess adverse impact;
  • Performing a predictive validity study for all exempt assessments currently in use and any new assessments the company expects to use;
  • Monitoring its assessments for exempt-level professional positions for adverse impact based on race, ethnicity and gender; and
  • Annually providing the EEOC with a detailed summary of the studies and the adverse impact analysis conducted.

As the Target case shows, even seemingly innocent employment screening practices can violate Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, employers who use such devices should carefully evaluate their potential adverse impacts before using or continuing them.

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

July 24, 2015

Safety Leave Offers Help to Abuse Victims

Posted in Safety Leave, Women's Economic Security Act tagged , , , , at 2:45 pm by Tom Jacobson

Safety leave

Safety leave is now available to many Minnesota employees who are victims of domestic abuse.

For victims of domestic abuse, sexual assault and stalking, seeking help is sometimes the most difficult first step toward safety and justice. Adding to the struggle is the reality that taking that step sometimes means committing time during the workday to seek help. Consequently, the fear of missing work has often been an obstacle to reporting those crimes, participating in the legal process, or otherwise seeking or providing help. However, for many Minnesota employees, there is a new tool to help them get over that hurdle: safety leave.

Safety leave was authorized under the Women’s Economic Security Act (WESA), which was signed into law by Gov. Mark Dayton in 2014. Under this new law, covered employers must allow most workers to use their personal sick leave for safety leave. “Safety leave” is defined as time away from work for the purpose of providing or receiving assistance because of sexual assault, domestic abuse or stalking. Safety leave may be used for assistance to the employee or the employee’s child, adult child, spouse, sibling, parent, mother-in-law, father-in-law, grandchild, grandparent, or stepparent.

Because of this new law, many employees now have a right to use sick leave benefits to take time off to seek or provide help to themselves and some family members when they are suffering from the devastating impacts of these crimes.

However, the law has limitations. For example, it does not require employers to provide sick leave. But, when they do, they must allow employees to use it for safety leave and for such reasonable times as may be necessary. Also, only employers with twenty-one or more employees at one or more sites are covered by this law.

Another limitation is that not all employees are eligible for safety leave. In order to be eligible, an employee must work for their employer for at least twelve months prior to the request for time off, and during that time, the employee must have worked at least half time.

The fear of missing work should not prevent domestic abuse, sexual assault and stalking victims from seeking help and justice. Safety leave is a new tool to make it easier for them to do so.

If you are an employee or employer who is wondering about your safety leave rights and responsibilities, please contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this article are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

July 20, 2015

FLSA Misclassification Proves Costly for Local Employer

Posted in Administrative Exemption, Computer-related Occupations Exemption, Enforcement, Executive Exemption, Exempt/Non-Exempt Employees, Fair Labor Standards Act, Minimum Wage, Outside Sales Exemption, Overtime, Professional Exemption tagged , , , , , , , , , at 10:22 am by Tom Jacobson

US Department of Labor v Patel

Local hotelier ordered to pay $184,000.00 to settle wage violation suit.

A Fargo, ND hotelier with a property in Alexandria, MN will pay nearly $200,000.00 to settle a lawsuit brought by the US Department of Labor (see Court Orders Hotel Owner to Pay More than $180K in Back Wages, Damages to 200 Workers Across North Dakota, Montana and Minnesota, DOL Release No. 15-1294-DAK; Lawsuit Settlement Helps Hotel Workers in Alexandria, Echo Press July 16, 2015). The DOL alleged in the suit that Bharat I. Patel violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay minimum wage and/or overtime rates to nearly 200 employees at a number of hotels, including the Country Inn and Suites in Alexandria.

More specifically, the DOL claimed that Patel misclassified nonexempt workers as exempt salaried employees (see US Labor Department Lawsuit Alleges Hotel Owner Owes $200K in Wages, Damages to 192 Workers at 13 Hotels, DOL December 16, 2104). This, the department said, resulted in these workers not receiving minimum wage for all hours worked and not being paid overtime. According to the DOL, the company also failed to combine hours for employees who worked at two locations in the same workweek and failed to maintain accurate records of all hours worked and pay rates.

The lawsuit was resolved via a July 10, 2015 consent judgment in which Patel denied any wrongdoing but agreed to pay $184,000.00 to settle the dispute. In addition Patel agreed to train managers on FLSA wage requirements and to provide workers information on wage laws and contact information for the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division for at least four years.

How are FLSA exemption mistakes made, and why are they so expensive? To answer that, one needs to understand the two basic principles of the FLSA’s overtime rule. First, the FLSA generally requires that employees be paid at 1.5 times their regular hourly rate for their overtime (that is, their hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek). Second, some employees, such as certain executives, administrators and professionals are exempt from that overtime requirement.

Claiming such exemptions may seem simple, but the FLSA has complex definitions of who can lawfully be classified as an exempt executive, administrator or professional. Those definitions all include a requirement that these employees be paid a salary of at least $455.00 per week. They also include a “duties test.” This requires that in addition to the salary requirement, the employees’ actual job duties must meet certain criteria before the employees can be considered exempt.

Thus, one of the most common mistakes starts when employers wrongly assume that by paying someone a salary, they automatically become exempt from overtime. Often, the employers also give that person a title such as “manager.” Then, the employers allow or require those people to work more than 40 hours per week without paying for the overtime.

But paying someone a salary and calling them a manager (or some other authoritative title) does not make them exempt if they do not also pass the duties test for an FLSA exemption.

This mistake is expensive. When non-exempt employees are misclassified as exempt, they are entitled to recover all of the overtime they should have been paid during the preceding two years. Plus, they can recover an additional equal amount as liquidated damages and their attorney’s fees and court costs. These costs are compounded when multiple employees are at issue. And, as was the case in Patel lawsuit, employers can also be ordered to implement other remedial measures such as training.

The DOL’s recent rulemaking actions provide an additional reason for employers to pay close attention to these FLSA exemption issues. On July 6, 2015 the DOL proposed a rule that would raise the salary basis test from around $23,600.00 per year to approximately $50,000.00 per year. If implemented, the new rule would greatly reduce the number employees who would be exempt under the law.

As the Patel case confirms, FLSA exemption mistakes are costly. And, based on recent DOL activity, those mistakes could get even more expensive in the future.

If you are an employer that is wondering if your employees are properly classified under the FLSA, or if you are an employee who wonders if you have been misclassified and underpaid, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

June 16, 2015

Medical Marijuana: Are You Ready to Roll with It?

Posted in Application Process, Discrimination, Drug and Alcohol Testing, Drug and Alcohol Testing, Medical Marijuana, Medical Marijuana, Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act tagged , , , , , , , at 9:53 am by Tom Jacobson

medical marijuana and the workplace

Medical cannabis can be lawfully dispensed in Minnesota starting July 1, 2015. How will it impact your workplace?

Medical marijuana (technically, “medical cannabis”) can be lawfully dispensed in Minnesota starting July 1, 2015. What does this mean for Minnesota employers?

First, the state’s new medical cannabis law generally prohibits Minnesota employers from using a job applicant’s or employee’s status of being on the medical cannabis registry as a reason for discriminating against that person. In other words, Minnesota employers generally cannot discipline, discharge or refuse to hire someone just because they are on the registry.

The new law also largely prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and applicants who test positive for cannabis unless they used, possessed or were impaired by the drug while at the work site or during work. While proving use or possession should not be too problematic, the law certainly complicates the “impaired by” part of the analysis.

Historically, employers could prove impairment by administering a drug test that complies with the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act (“MDATWA”). A positive test under MDATWA opened the door for future disciplinary action or withdrawing a job offer. Now, not only are employers prohibited from discriminating against employees and applicants who test positive, but also employees and applicants will have the right to provide their medical cannabis registration as an explanation for a positive test. While this still does not allow a registered patient to use, possess or be impaired by the drug at work, the challenge is that a positive test for cannabis will not necessarily prove when the employee or applicant used, possessed or was impaired by the drug.

As noted above, these are the general rules. There are a few key exceptions. Specifically, employers may discriminate against those on the state’s medical marijuana registry if failing to do so would violate federal law or regulations or cause the employer to lose a monetary or licensing-related benefit under federal law or regulations. Thus, employers who are covered by laws such as the Federal Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 or the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 will be able to hold registered patients to a higher standard.

Employers also need to recognize that Minnesota’s medical marijuana law differs significantly from comparable laws in other states. Therefore, they should not pay too much attention to what happens elsewhere. For example, in one recent case (Coats v. Dish Network, LLC) the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Dish Network lawfully fired an employee who tested positive for marijuana, even though that employee was apparently using the drug lawfully under that state’s marijuana laws. Given Minnesota’s prohibition against discriminating against registered patients who test positive, the outcome would probably be different here.

As a practical matter, dealing with the implications of the state’s medical cannabis law should be a relatively rare occurrence. The state estimates there are only 5,000 people (about 0.09% of the entire state) who will qualify to be on the registry (see J. Ehrlich, Minnesota Medical Marijuana: What You Need to Know, MPR News, June 1, 2015). With a labor force of about three million workers (see Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development Unemployment Statistics for April, 2015), that means there are probably only 2,700 potential workers statewide who could be on the registry. Given the severity of the conditions for which a person may qualify to be on the registry, the likelihood of those people also being in the workforce is even more remote.

Nevertheless, employers must be prepared to address the workplace challenges presented by Minnesota’s medical cannabis law. Specifically, workplace drug and alcohol policies (particularly MDATWA-compliant testing policies) should be reviewed and revised if needed to take into account the state’s medical cannabis law. And, employers will need to rely on evidence other than a drug test if they want to take action against employees or applicants who they believe have used, possessed or were impaired by marijuana on the work site or during work hours.

For more information, see please contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this article are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

June 15, 2015

Supreme Court Rules for EEOC in Abercrombie & Fitch Dress Code Case

Posted in Application Process, Discrimination, Dress Code, Grooming, Reasonable Accommodation, Relgious Discrimination, Religion, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 tagged , , , , , , , , at 10:36 am by Tom Jacobson

Employers must now use more caution when their dress codes clash with their employees’ religious beliefs. That is the result of the United States Supreme Court’s June 1, 2015 ruling in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

The case arose after Samantha Elauf applied for a job with Abercrombie. Elauf is a practicing Muslim who, consistent with her understanding of her religion’s requirements, wears a headscarf known as a hijab. Abercrombie had a “look policy” that prohibited employees from wearing “caps” as being too informal for work attire. The policy did not define “caps.”

After an interview, the assistant store manager rated Elauf as qualified to be hired, but she was concerned that the headscarf would violate the company’s “look” policy. Elauf, however, never requested an exception to that policy so that she could wear the hijab. The assistant manager asked her district manager for guidance, and she told the district manager that she believed Elauf wore the headscarf because or her faith. The district manager said the headscarf would violate the look policy, and he directed the assistant store manager to not hire Elauf.

The EEOC then sued Abercrombie on behalf of Elauf on the basis that the company’s refusal to hire Elauf violated the religious discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. The trial court ruled in favor of the EEOC (See Abercrombie & Fitch Dressed Down over Hijab in Religious Discrimination Case). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that because Elauf never provided Abercrombie with actual notice of her need for accommodation of her religious belief, Abercrombie could not be liable under Title VII.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the EEOC and trial court. Specifically, the high court ruled that to prove a claim of religious discrimination in the workplace, an applicant need only show only that his/her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer knew of the need. An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.

Thus, even if an employee or applicant has not requested a religious accommodation (for example, a dress code or grooming policy exception, schedule modification, etc.), an employer must not use that person’s religious faith as a factor in making decisions about the employee or applicant. In addition, employers should keep their dress and grooming codes somewhat flexible to allow for the accommodation of affected religious beliefs.

For more information, see the EEOC’s publications, Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace and Fact Sheet on Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, or contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz Cass, PA

May 26, 2015

Registration Deadline is June 1 for Employment Law Update

Posted in Americans with Disabilities Act, Application Process, Arrest records, Background Checking, Ban the Box, Conviction Records, Credit Checks, Criminal History, Disability, Discrimination, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Form I-9, Interactive Process, Leaves of Absence, Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Parenting Leave Act, Parenting Leave, Pregnancy Leave, Reasonable Accommodation, Recruiting, Safety Leave, Sick Leave, Sick or Injured Child Care Leave, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Training, Unexcused Absence, Voting Rights, Women's Economic Security Act tagged , , , , , at 4:20 pm by Tom Jacobson

attorney Tom Jacobson alexandria mn

Tom Jacobson

The registration deadline for the Twelfth Annual West Central Minnesota Employment Law Update is June 1. Seating for the June 11, 2015 event is limited, so please register soon if you plan to attend.

For more details and registration forms, please see Registration Open for Twelfth Annual West Central MN Employment Law Update, or contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com or 320-763-3141.

I hope to see you on June 11!

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

April 29, 2015

Supreme Court Slams Brakes on EEOC Lawsuits

Posted in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Conciliation, Discrimination, EEOC Conciliation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 tagged , , , , at 3:57 pm by Tom Jacobson

IMG_5578The United States Supreme Court today slammed the brakes on lawsuits started by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Specifically, the Court ruled that because the EEOC has a statutory duty to attempt conciliation before suing, the courts have authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled that duty. Giving courts the authority to review EEOC conciliation should stifle what some believed was the EEOC’s overly zealous litigation strategy.

The case is Mach Mining, LLC v EEOC, which started as a Title VII sex discrimination charge against the company. During its investigation, the EEOC found probable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred. The agency then invited the company to participate in conciliation to resolve the dispute. The agency also said that a representative would contact them to start the process. A year later the EEOC sent another letter saying that conciliation had been unsuccessful. The EEOC then sued the company.

In response to the lawsuit, Mach Mining argued that the EEOC had not attempted to conciliate in good faith before suing them. This argument was based on Title VII’s requirement that before suing, the EEOC must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”

The EEOC countered by arguing that the courts do not have the power to decide whether or not the agency makes such an effort. The agency also argued that even if the courts have that power, its two letters to Mach Mining met that standard.

The Court agreed with Mach Mining and held that the courts have the authority to review whether or not pre-suit conciliation was adequate. Specifically, the Court noted that:

Judicial review of administrative action is the norm in our legal system, and nothing in Title VII withdraws the courts’ authority to determine whether the EEOC has fulfilled its duty to attempt conciliation of claims.

The Court then went on to establish a judicial process for making this determination:

  • A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has performed its conciliation obligations but that its efforts have failed will usually suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement.
  • If the employer then provides credible evidence of its own, in the form of an affidavit or otherwise, indicating that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim, a court must conduct the fact-finding necessary to decide that limited dispute.
  • Should the court find in favor of the employer, the appropriate remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary compliance.

By adding this level of judicial oversight to the EEOC charge process, those faced with Title VII discrimination charges should now have greater assurance that the EEOC will work harder to resolve those charges informally before rushing to the courthouse.

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

April 17, 2015

Registration Open for Twelfth Annual West Central MN Employment Law Update

Posted in Americans with Disabilities Act, Application Process, Arrest records, Background Checking, Ban the Box, Conviction Records, Credit Checks, Criminal History, Disability, Discrimination, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Form I-9, Interactive Process, Leaves of Absence, Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Parenting Leave Act, Parenting Leave, Pregnancy Leave, Reasonable Accommodation, Recruiting, Safety Leave, Sick Leave, Sick or Injured Child Care Leave, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Training, Unexcused Absence, Voting Rights, Women's Economic Security Act tagged , , , , , at 9:19 am by Tom Jacobson

attorney Tom Jacobson alexandria mn

Tom Jacobson

Registration is now open for the Twelfth Annual West Central Minnesota Employment Law Update to be held Thursday, June 11, 2015. The event is sponsored by West Central Minnesota SHRM, and it will be held at Alexandria Technical and Community College.

The morning session is designed to inform employers about developing areas of employment law, and it will be presented by four attorneys who practice extensively in that area of the law: Tom Jacobson, Mike Moberg, Sara McGrane and Penelope Phillips. Topics for this year’s event will include:

  • An update on significant employment law developments since last year’s event
  • How to apply the myriad of leave / time off entitlements required by Minnesota law
  • What to do when the ADA, FMLA and worker’s compensation collide due to an employee’s medical condition
  • Legal traps in recruiting

The afternoon session will feature award-winning speaker Andy Masters. Masters is an award-winning author and international speaker who provides attendees with not only a memorable multi-media experience, but also immediate “take-home” value for all levels of HR leadership to help them develop and empower a workforce of future leaders.

Click on the following links for more information and the registration form:

Comments from prior years:

  • “Great event!”
  • “Excellent – would highly recommend!”
  • “I go to several conferences/seminars every year & this is the most informative of all.  Plus, the group is open & friendly — very nice! Thank you!”
  • “Overall — great day & worth the time!”
  • “Excellent program for the price.”

Contact me at taj@alexandriamnlaw.com or 320-763-3141 if you need more information. We hope you can join us on June 11!

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

March 26, 2015

Pregnancy Accommodation Claims Revived by US Supreme Court in Young v. UPS

Posted in Discrimination, Gender / Sex, Pregnancy, Pregnancy, Pregnancy Leave, Reasonable Accommodation, Women's Economic Security Act tagged , , , , , at 11:56 pm by Tom Jacobson

pregnancy accommodation

Me, in 1991, wearing the “empathy belly” in Lamaze class the day before our first son was born.

In a 6-3 decision the U.S. Supreme Court this week revived Peggy Young’s pregnancy accommodation claims against UPS. The high court’s decision clarifies how the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) is to be applied to pregnant employees who work for employers that accommodate employees with nonpregnancy-related disabilities.

The PDA is a 1978 addition to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The law has two main parts. First, it says that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Second, it says that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”

At issue in Young’s case was the fact that after she became pregnant, her doctor imposed a 20 pound lifting restriction. UPS had a 70 pound lifting requirement for drivers like Young, so they told her she could not work while under that restriction. Young, however, presented evidence that UPS accommodated other workers who suffered on-the-job injuries, had ADA-qualifying disabilities, or had lost their Department of Transportation certifications. Thus, Young claimed that UPS violated the PDA by accommodating the other workers but not those who were pregnant.

The District Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals both rejected Young’s claims, but the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and revived her case. In so doing, the court established the following framework for proving that a woman was subjected to disparate treatment under the pregnancy accommodation requirements of the PDA.

First, the woman must present evidence that: (a) she belongs to the protected class; (b) she sought accommodation; (c) the employer did not accommodate her; and (d) the employer accommodated others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” If the employee proves that much, the employer may then try to justify its failure to accommodate by presenting evidence of “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation. If the employer does so, the employee may then try to rebut that evidence with evidence that the employer’s reason was a pretext (that is, a facade or cover-up of the real discriminatory reason).

The case clarifies that pregnancy accommodation claims can be brought under the PDA, and it establishes what must be proved in order to win such cases. Therefore, it is important for employers and employees to understand their respective rights and obligations under this law. In particular they need to recognize that employers must accommodate pregnant employees if they accommodate nonpregnant employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work.”

Finally, here’s a reminder for Minnesota employers and employees. The state’s Women’s Economic Security Act (WESA), which was passed in 2014, includes its own pregnancy accommodation requirements. This law only applies to Minnesota employers with 21 or more employees. The PDA, however, applies to employers with 15 or more employees. Consequently, smaller employers (15-20 employees) will only have to comply with the PDA, but larger ones will need to comply with both laws.

My wife and I with said first-born in 2014 at his graduation from the US Air Force Academy (not likely due to the empathy belly).

My wife and I in 2014 with said first-born at his graduation from the US Air Force Academy (not likely due to the empathy belly).

For more information about this article, please contact me at alexandriamnlaw.com or  taj@alexandriamnlaw.com.

The comments posted in this blog are for general informational purposes only. They are not to be considered as legal advice, and they do not establish an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice regarding your specific situation, please consult your attorney.

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

March 20, 2015

Save the Date for Twelfth Annual West Central MN Employment Law Update

Posted in Americans with Disabilities Act, Application Process, Arrest records, Background Checking, Ban the Box, Conviction Records, Credit Checks, Criminal History, Disability, Discrimination, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Form I-9, Interactive Process, Leaves of Absence, Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Parenting Leave Act, Parenting Leave, Pregnancy Leave, Reasonable Accommodation, Recruiting, Safety Leave, Sick Leave, Sick or Injured Child Care Leave, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Training, Unexcused Absence, Voting Rights, Women's Economic Security Act tagged , , , , at 9:04 am by Tom Jacobson

The twelfth annual West Central Minnesota Employment Law Update will be held Thursday, June 11, 2015 at Alexandria Technical and Community College. The morning session is designed to inform employers about developing areas of employment law, and it will be presented by four attorneys who practice extensively in that area of the law: Tom Jacobson, Mike Moberg, Sara McGrane and Penelope Phillips. Topics for this year’s event will include:

  • An update on significant employment law developments since last year’s event
  • How to apply the myriad of leave / time off entitlements required by Minnesota law
  • What to do when the ADA, FMLA and worker’s compensation collide due to an employee’s medical condition
  • Legal traps in recruiting

The afternoon session will feature award-winning speaker Andy Masters.

Comments from prior years:

  • “Great event!”
  • “Excellent – would highly recommend!”
  • “I go to several conferences/seminars every year & this is the most informative of all.  Plus, the group is open & friendly — very nice! Thank you!”
  • “Overall — great day & worth the time!”
  • “Excellent program for the price.”

We hope you can join us on June 11! Stay tuned for registration, agenda and other details.

Save the Date

Copyright 2015 Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Schultz, PA

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